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Thank you to Mr. Rastogi for responding 
(Rastogi, 2014) to my article (Henman, 2013) 
on generalized empirical method. It is not pos-
sible to respond to all of Rastogi’s comments in a 
dialogue-form article so I limit myself to central 
features of his response.
In the fi rst place, the implementation of gen-
eralized empirical method does not challenge the 
principle of commonality in neuroscience. The 
individual cognitive operations - as outlined in 
my original article - will manifest limited and 
minor differences in correlates, but the content 
of a mental act will also be a contributing factor 
to changes in cerebral activity. Both the strength 
of connectivity and the direction from target to 
source will differ depending on the operation oc-
curring and the content of the operation (Harri-
son, 2008). Experiments with different insights 
have revealed different types of restructuring ac-
tivity as well as more numerous correlates than 
most other mental acts (Gulyas, 2009, p.256). 
Commonality of regional activity is maintained 
to a limit but also subject to the stochastic plas-
ticity of the cerebral organ.
Generalized empirical method is not an idea; 
it is an acknowledgment of the empirical reality 
of the operations of conscious cognitional activ-
ity. All data, of sense and of consciousness, man-
ifest through the cognitive acts immanent intel-
ligibility as do the operations of cognition. It is 
these operations that discover and thematize the 
intelligibility immanent in data. In other words, 
they are the origin of meaning and when they 
are understood scientifi cally, the researcher has 
a higher control of meaning in both the horizons 
of common sense and theory. As data, the op-
erations are intelligible; as operations, they are 
intelligent (Lonergan, 1992, p.346).
A scientist does not have to be a neuroscien-
tist in order to establish a nominal account of a 
theory of thinking. An explanatory account re-
sulting in a defi nition would require scientifi c 
work within the context of Bernard Lonergan’s 
methodical work, Insight (Lonergan, 1992, p.35, 
357-358). But one must do some science in some 
fi eld, or some form of puzzling, to provide the 
data so that one may refl ect on one’s performance 
in order to lift the awareness of these operations 
into a scientifi c perspective (Lonergan, 1992, 
p.353-357). Furthermore, generalized empirical 
method reveals the need to determine the func-
tions of both the biological cerebral organ and 
the conscious operations and their correspond-
ing relationships within the context of emergent 
probability. (Lonergan, 1992, chapter 15, sec-
tions 6 & 7, Chapter 4, sections 2.4 & 2.5) There 
is the need in all the sciences for scientists to 
advert to their own operations to provide a more 
systematic and common foundational approach 
to their work in order to increase the probabili-
ties of cumulative and progressive results.
Generalized empirical method offers the 
ground for a division of labour by recognizing 
that each operation relates to a different task in 
the scientifi c venture ( Anderson, 1996, p.167; 
McShane, 2013, chapter 14; Shute, 2010, p.233-
243) - attention, the activity of gathering relevant 
data; understanding, the task of interpreting the 
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data; judgment, lining up the different interpreta-
tions within their historical context; and fi nally 
decision, determining which interpretation is the 
best explanation. These tasks need to be divided, 
as no scientist in contemporary research can re-
main abreast of all that is going on in his or her 
fi eld. Generalized empirical method provides 
the possibility of intelligent collaboration and 
development, which functional specialization 
will reveal over time. The functional specialist 
approach is grounded in the different tasks relat-
ing to the cognitional levels and not in different 
types of data. Implementation of the best avail-
able explanation requires four further divisions: 
foundations, policies, systematics and commu-
nications. (Shute, 2010, p.236) There are two 
stages, the fi rst four specialities bring forward 
work and the second stage of four specialities, 
are orientated to the future.
As for the injection of the researcher’s subjec-
tivity into one’s work, the issue is; do we under-
stand in an explanatory context just what subjec-
tivity is? If this procedure is an “intrinsic quality 
in the objectivity of the scan data itself” (Ras-
togi, 2014) and yet unknown as to what it is or 
how such an intrinsic quality functions, we have 
an unknown variable in the scientifi c procedure. 
That unknown can be known by beginning with 
the question; what am I doing when I am know-
ing? The major hurdle here is the diffi culty in 
expanding one’s notion of empirical beyond the 
positivism that has pervaded science for over a 
century.a Generalized empirical method which 
includes both the data of sense and the data of 
consciousness will over time reveal an explana-
tory account of human subjectivity and its rela-
tionship to scientifi c research.
Finally, I wish to thank Mr. Rastogi for tak-
ing the time to respond offering me an opportu-
nity to expand on the central topic of my origi-
nal article. A fuller account of the implications 
of generalized empirical method and Rastogi’s 
comments would require much more than can be 
offered in a brief article.
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Endnote
a: I am presently carrying out research on the reduction-
ist language used in neuro cognitive science which will 
not only help manifest the cognitive operations as data but 
also provide theoretical possibilities for the explaining of 
the functions and relationships between the data of the ce-
rebral organ and the conscious cognitive operations that 
every researcher utilizes in their work.
